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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
$1,137.00 IN CASH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
t 
t BRIEF 
1 
t Case No. 
:Priority No. 
Brief of Appellee 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court 
to hear this appeal by Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (J) 1953, as 
amended. 
2. This appeal is from a judgment forfeiting $1,137.00 in 
cash, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13 (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was there sufficient evidence on which the trier of 
fact could base its judgement forfeiting the money because of its 
connection to a drug transaction? 
2. Did the State present sufficient evidence to meet its 
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the statutory provisions upon which the 
State relies are included in the body of this brief and are 
included verbatim in the addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Second District Court of Davis 
County, State of Utah, forfeiting $1,137.00 in cash. This money 
was seized by the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force on April 10, 
1990, from Joseph A. Gallegos during the course of a controlled 
substance arrest. (T.19, 20). In a trial held in this matter on 
the 21st day of December, 1989, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, 
forfeited the money to the State of Utah. (T. 40). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 10, 1990, Deputy Lon Brian ("Brian") of the Davis 
County Sheriff's Office was contacted by a Mr. Derrek Perry 
("Perry") regarding the sale of some cocaine. (T. 14, 15). Perry 
told Brian that he had a friend who had a large sum of money that 
wanted to purchase some cocaine. (T. 15). Deputy Brian told Perry 
that he had a quarter pound of cocaine that he would sell for 
$3000. (T.15.) Arrangements were made for Brian to meet Perry at 
the Layton Hills Mall. (T. 15). After picking up Perry, Brian was 
instructed to drive to a residence in Clinton, Utah. The residence 
was that of Frank Reyna and Joseph A. Gallegos ("Gallegos"). (T. 
16). 
Upon arriving at the residence, immediate conversation 
ensued between Brian and Gallegos regarding the cocaine purchase. 
(T. 16, 17). As Gallegos and Brian negotiated the transaction, 
Brian had a conversation with Gallegos about controlled substance 
transactions. (T. 19). Gallegos told Brian that he was a dealer 
in controlled substances and had a supplier in Salt Lake. (T. 20, 
21). It was ultimately determined that Gallegos wanted to purchase 
a quarter gram of cocaine from Brian. (T. 17). Gallegos then took 
a large sum of money from his pocket and attempted to purchase the 
cocaine with a $100 bill, but ultimately paid with a $10 bill after 
being told Brian did not have change for the $100 bill. (T. 19). 
Gallegos was then arrested and $1,127.00 in cash was found on his 
person. (T. 21). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court was correct in its determination that the 
$1,137.00 should be forfeited to the State. There was sufficient 
evidence presented at trial that Gallegos was and had been involved 
as a dealer in controlled substances for at least three years. 
From the evidence before the court it was fair for the trier of 
fact to conclude that Gallegos was a dealer in cocaine and that the 
money found on him was used or intended to be used in violation of 
the Controlled Substances Act. The Judge, as the trier of fact, 
chose to believe the evidence presented by the state as the most 
credible. The defense did not sufficiently rebut the presumption 
that the $1,137.00 found on Gallegos was forfeitable under Utah 
law. 
ARGUMENT 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE 
Utah law is clear that when reviewing a case on appeal for 
the sufficiency of the evidence, the Appellate court construes that 
evidence and any inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to 
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the findings of the finder of fact. State of Utah vs. One 1982 
Silver Honda Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392 (Utah App. 1987), quoting, 
State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985). 
There is ample evidence in this case to support the 
judgement of the trial court. Deputy Brian testified that when 
first contacted by Perry about the cocaine deal, a large amount of 
money was mentioned. (T. 15). When Brian arrived at the Gallegos 
house, immediate conversation ensued between Brian and Gallegos 
regarding the cocaine purchase. (T. 16, 17). As Gallegos and 
Brian negotiated the transaction, Brian had a conversation with 
Gallegos about controlled substance transactions. (T« 19). 
Gallegos told Brian that he was a dealer and that he had a source 
in Salt Lake that he had consistently used for the past three 
years. (T. 20). Brian indicated to Gallegos that he may be able 
to give Gallegos a better price. Gallegos responded by saying it 
would not be wise to try to take this individual's business. (T. 
20). 
There was further discussion between Brian and Gallegos as 
to the amount of cocaine that was to be purchased. Brian had come 
prepared to sell a quarter pound, but was told by Gallegos that he 
only wanted a taste. (T. 17). After further discussion it was 
determined that Gallegos wanted a quarter gram of cocaine. (T. 
17). Brian then went out to the car and brought the cocaine into 
the house. (T. 18). Gallegos did not have any scales (T. 18), or 
a razor blade, so a mirror was taken off the wall to measure out 
the cocaine. (T. 19.). Gallegos then took a large sum of money 
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from his pocket and purchased the cocaine for ten dollars. (T. 
19). Gallegos was then arrested and $1,127.00 in cash was found on 
his person. (T. 21). 
When initially discussing the purchase with Brian, Perry 
did not indicate to Brian that Gallegos only wanted a taste even 
when told by Brian that he had a large amount for sale. (T. 7-8). 
Perry even told Brian that he had seen a large amount of cash on 
Gallegos. (T. 8). While at the Gallegos residence with Brian, 
Perry told Brian, when Gallegos stated he only wanted a taste, that 
there must be a misunderstanding because Gallegos was drunk. (T. 
12). 
At trial, Gallegos admitted that he was drunk on the night 
of the transaction and that he did not know what he may have told 
Brian about being a drug dealer. (T. 30). Gallegos did admit 
telling Brian that he was involved with drugs, but then testified 
at trial the he "was just lying to him." (T. 30). 
Gallegos also testified that he had the money as a result 
of a sheepherding job he had just completed and that he never 
intended to purchase more than a taste of the cocaine. (T. 29) He 
produced no other evidence of the source of the money, no check 
stub, receipt or testimony from any employer. 
It is well established that the trial court is in the most 
advantageous position to judge the credibility of witnesses. 
Shioii v. Shioli, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985); Reimchiissel v. 
Russell, 649 P.2d 26 (Utah 1982); and Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 
1176 (Utah 1989). 
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In Doelle v. Bradley. supra, the Court stated that "to 
successfully attack findings of fact, an appellant must first 
marshall all the evidence supporting the findings and then 
demonstrate that, even if viewed in the light most favorable to the 
trial court, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
findings•" 784 P.2d at 1178. In addition, as this Court stated in 
Reimschissel v. Russell, supra, it is not the prerogative of the 
Supreme Court to determine whether evidence preponderates on one 
side or the other. That is the responsibility of the trier of 
fact. The role of the Supreme Court is "to determine whether there 
is substantial evidence in the record to support the ruling." 649 
P.2d at 27. 
Clearly the credible evidence in this case supports the 
findings of the trial court. Deputy Brian related what Gallegos 
had told him regarding his dealing in controlled substance 
transactions. The defense relies on the testimony of Gallegos to 
support its position. However, Gallegos admitted that he was drunk 
and does not remember all that he told Brian, but denies he said 
anything about being a dealer in controlled substances. 
The Court in evaluating the testimony of Gallegos could 
look at factors indicating that he was not believable. For 
example, Gallegos stated that he had never used cocaine before this 
(T. 31, 32). Even though he stated he was drunk and he could 
remember exactly how much money he had on him, Gallegos claimed he 
did not remember telling Brian he was a dealer or about his 
connection in Salt Lake. 
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The trier of fact was correct in its decision based upon 
the testimony of Brian and its findings should not be disturbed by 
this Court. 
POINT II 
DEPENDANT HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY REBUT THE PRESUMPTION 
FOUND IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 58-37-13 
It has been established that a forfeiture is a civil action 
and, therefore, the burden of proof on the state is by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
Leasing Co. . 416 US 663, 40 L.Ed 2d 452 (1974); In re Various Items 
of Personal Property v. U.S., 282 US 577, 75 L.Ed. 558 (1931); 
People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 231 P.2d 832 (1951). 
The forfeiture statute that applies in this case is Utah 
Code Annotated §58-37-13, which states in pertinent part as 
follows: 
"1. The following are subject to forfeiture and no property 
right exists in them: 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be 
furnished in exchange for a controlled substance 
in violation of this act, all proceeds traceable 
to any violation of this act, and all monies, 
negotiable instruments, and securities used or 
intended to be used to facilitate any violation 
of this act; but: 
(i) an interest in property may not be 
forfeited under this Section if the holder 
of the interest did not know of the act 
which made the property subject to 
forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to 
the act; and 
(ii) there is a rebuttable presumption that all 
money, coins, and currency found in 
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proximity to forfeitable controlled 
substances, drug manufacturing or 
distributing paraphernalia, or to 
forfeitable records of the importation, 
manufacture or distribution of controlled 
substances are forfeitable under this 
Section; the burden of proof is upon 
claimants of the property to rebut this 
presumption; 
it 
• • • . 
For money to be forfeitable, therefore, it must first be 
found in proximity to a controlled substance or be used or intended 
to be used in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Once 
this is established, the defense can then put on evidence to rebut 
the presumption that this money is forfeitable. 
As set forth herein, there is sufficient evidence in the 
record to support the finding of the court. The defense did put in 
evidence that the money was not intended to be used in connection 
with controlled substances and also where that money came from and 
where it was intended to go. However, conflicting evidence, by 
itself, does not warrant disturbing the findings of the trier of 
fact. State v. Tolman, 775 P. 2d 422 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Breinholt, 747 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah Ct App 1987); State v. Arroyo, 
770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct App 1989) The trier of fact is in the best 
position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and may believe 
one against all others. In this case, Judge Cornaby must have 
believed the testimony of Deputy Brian over that of Gallegos. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment of forfeiture is supported by 
the evidence diicJ uliuultl be upheld by this coi 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^y' day of November, 1990. 
William K. McGuire 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §58-37-13 
Hl. The following are subject to forfeiture and no property 
right exists in them: 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be 
furnished in exchange for a controlled substance 
in violation of this act, all proceeds traceable 
to any violation of this act, and all monies, 
negotiable instruments, and securities used or 
intended to be used to facilitate any violation 
of this act; but: 
(i) an interest in property may not be forfeit-
ed under this Section if the holder of the 
interest did not know of the act which made 
the property subject to forfeiture, or did 
not willingly consent to the act; and 
(ii) there is a rebuttable presumption that all 
money, coins, and currency found in proxim-
ity to forfeitable controlled substances, 
drug manufacturing or distributing para-
phernalia, or to forfeitable records of the 
importation, manufacture or distribution of 
controlled substances are forfeitable under 
this Section; the burden of proof is upon 
claimants of the property to rebut this 
presumption; 
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